On 07th December 2010, Egor Sviridov was out in the early hours of a chilly Moscow night with his wife and a number of friends. A member of Fratria, a Spartak Moscow fan group, Sviridov was having a final catch up in a bar before taking an early flight to Slovakia for his teams champions league clash with MSK Zelinica. Sviridov would never make his flight. Instead he would be murdered after leaving the bar sometime at 00:30 hours in the morning, killed by a plastic bullet to the back of his head that would tear half his skull off. His friends would be marginally more fortunate, surviving multiple gun shots, but severely injured nevertheless.
The minute details of Sviridov’s death has been argued about ever since. His wife who accompanied him claims that he was totally sober and that the group were attacked after some passer-by’s wrongly misinterpreted something said as a racist remark; his killer, Aslan Cherkesov, a muslim man from the Caucasus region of Russia (predominately non-slavic ethincally), claims that he acted in self-defence after being attacked by a clearly drunk Sviridov and his group. Cherkesov was eventually charged with murder.
Sviridov’s death sparked an unprecedented reaction in Russia; surprisingly able to unify deeply feuding factions in the various football supporter groups of Moscow, who on the day of his funeral gathered together in a group near 10,000 strong to pay their respects at his death site, and then march on the kremlin in protest at the perceived leniency being show to the killer (Cherkesov was not originally charged and released). Yet as people walked between the death site and the place of gathering at Manezhnaya Square, the mood turned violent. The protestors turned on anyone walking in the vicinity who had a non-slavic appearance, and as the police moved in to control the situation a full scale riot broke out. Cherkesov would be re-arrested and tried as the public protest reached several cities in the country. One might be forgiven for asking why in a country with some of the highest murder rates in the first world, Sviridov’s death merited such shock and reaction? And what this has to do with football?
Cherkesov was from the Caucasus Region of Russia, which has posed several problematic questions for Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union. A region of predominantly Muslim, non-ethnic slavs (the majority of “white” Russians) the calls for independent breakaway republics has been very active since 1990. The most famous of these results in the 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars of the mid to late 90’s, where Russia lost, then regained control of Chechnya despite heavy casualties on the Russian side. The bitterness at having initially lost the first Chechen War along with a sharp influx of migrants arriving in predominately Slavic cities to the North fleeing the violence, did much to fuel hatred, mistrust and fear in the Russian population. The Chechens had been displayed as terrorists in the Russian media, so the arrival of such people in Slavic communities bred xenophobia.
At this time in the late 1990’s the Russian economy was severely under strain. The football league was a distant second to Hockey’s popularity, with only team that had any cash and decent structure (Spartak Moscow). Spartak dominated the league in the 1990’s winning 9 out of 10 championships. Football venues were largely empty places, frequented by the typically disenfranchised groups that had flooded stadiums in the UK in the 70’s and 80’s. Yet uniquely in the context of Russia, football also formed a cultural crossover between the Caucasus and Russia major, as football was the main sport in the Caucasus region, and teams from the area had maintained a consistent presence in the top flight of Russian Football since it had begun.
The only team to stop the decade long Spartak domination was Alania Vladikavkaz, a team from North Ossetia (next to Chechnya). In 1995 as they romped to a title that would put Leicester’s recent achievements into perspective, they were increasingly attracting radical Neo-Nazi presence at their games from opposition fans, motivated by the discontent felt towards the ongoing war in Chechnya and embarrassing worldwide gaze of Russia’s failures to beat a much smaller, poorly equipped enemy. Even though Alania were from a majority Orthodox Christian area, all Caucasians were singled out for their difference in appearance, more Georgian/central Asian than Slavic. Alania were subjected to chants of “Russia for the Russians” from fan groups that were starting to swell with far-right activists, a relatively easier target than the ongoing problems in the generic social picture.
Russia would win the second Chechen war as the millennium turned, and a brutal suppression of the various Islamic independence militia’s and terrorist organisations begun. These terrorist groups responded with a campaign of various sick acts, most notably a series of bombings on the Moscow metro, the Moscow Theatre, the Beslan School crisis, and the bombing of the Sapsan train line between the countries biggest two cities. North Caucasus people were treated with severe suspicion in society increasingly.
About the same time, Russian football’s popularity had started to increase domestically. Traditionally always sub-servient to the far more popular government endorsed Ice Hockey leagues, football had overtaken Hockey as the number one sport in Russia in the early 2000’s. This brought with it a raft of money from a succession of rich owners that started to lash down huge sums of money on players. Often clubs were bought for status, with major players in the oil market buying the clubs (Abramovich “sponsored” CSKA Moscow, Gazprom bought Zenit, Lukoil bought Spartak, and so on). Increasingly football became of cultural and political importance, yet increasing numbers of new fans were introduced to a footballing system that had long had an overlap between the darker sections of society that were currently in occupation. Far from changing the culture of those in situ, the opposite seemed to happen as less radical people with social concerns found themselves surrounded with more vocal groups advocating a far more radical solution.
The turning point is often seen as 2005, when Vladimir Putin declared victory against the various Chechen separatists and handed power to an appointed local politician deep in his pocket. Chechnya’s capital lay in ruins after heavy fighting, but in a move similar to the USA’s “winning hearts and minds campaign”, Putin would pledge to dedicate large amounts of cash to its rebuild. On top of the agenda was the building of a new stadium for the main Chechen club Terek Grozny, and a substantial investment to spend on players for this new team. While the less cynical would see the attempt to create normalcy and a rallying point for locals ravished by war, the general Russian footballing public were horrified when Ramzan Kadyrov was made the new club’s chairman. Kadyrov and his father had been fierce fighters against Russia in the war until they conveniently switched sides towards the end, and as a result gained a large number of the spoils. Russian opposition clubs seen this as an unfairly funded state team, led by a former deep enemy of the state, representing a people who were not Russian.
Match-fixing accusations followed, and the position of both sides escalated. The apparent footballing corruption and state support drifted into popular social culture, and soon enough it became a common belief that people from the Caucasus were involved in crime, violence and corruption. Fan groups complained of violence from Terek fans as much as people on the streets gave anecdotal accounts of violence or safety concerns on the streets. The “Caucasian block” increasingly became a target of the various Slavic fan groups, either for “retaliatory” violence or the subject of racist chants. “Russia for the Russians” rang out from all football teams, even in matches that did not involve any teams from the region. The more society was warped into believing the increasing caricature of the Caucasian, the more it became acceptable to vent these frustrations in football stands.
All this leads to Sviridov. By 2010 the position of political power gained by these football fan groups had gotten out of control. Happy to see football in the 90’s and 00’s as a place where certain anti-slavic and pro-nationalist sentiments could be aired freely, by the time of Sviridov’s death these ultra-groups held so much political and populist power that Putin would end up settling the riots by promising to come down more heavily on crimes committed by non-Russians as a result. Despite Putin having a serious aim of trying to bring the population of the Caucasus closer to Moscow, football’s ultra-groups had in the space of one afternoon forced him to provide a political solution that was detrimental to his previous aims; ones that he had spent significant cash trying to achieve.
Although not seen as a victory over Putin directly, this obvious political victory has had the effect of “taking the gloves off” for the various ultra-groups. Spartak Moscow ultra’s almost immediately called for a boycott of Caucasus fans and away matches. Despite it being seen as almost impossible to carry out, CSKA Moscow ultra’s were soon to join them, followed by Lokomotiv Moscow and Dynamo Moscow shortly after, signifying a worrying increasing trend for the previously deep enemy groups working together for their nationalist aims and messages.
Acts of violence and aggression after this period skyrocket. Zenit would unleash a huge Chechen flag that was burned in their match with Terek Grozny. Kuban Krasnodar would repeat the act, but this time with a Degastani Flag ( another Islamic region next to Chechnya). The call of “beat the Khaches”, the later a hugely derogatory word for people from the Caucasus, became standard in all matches. Incredibly, when CSKA Moscow faced Anzhi in the 2013 Cup Final, no CSKA fans turned up due to the boycott, and the Russian FA were forced to invite people to dress in red colours in exchange for a free ticket, to make it look like CSKA fans had actually turned up.
The case of Anzhi themselves is an interesting one. Purchased in 2011 by Suleyman Kerimov, a billionaire, they brought in a raft of players on huge salaries to play in Makhachkala, in Dagestan, a problematic area that had experienced constant insurgencies against the Russian government. Lauded the footballing world over for how much money they were prepared to spend on talent, it is now suggested that the whole project was a government attempt to win influence over the local population, with serious investment in the football team supposed to enliven and promote positivity in the area before the Sochi Olympics, situated geographically close away. In the context of Russian football, Anzhi’s huge investment only served to heighten hatred from other Slavic based football teams. It is interesting that, in terms of financing, Terek Grozny and Anzhi has faded in direct proportionality to the amount of violence in society in their respected republics. The teams were setup and hugely funded, and have started to drift and fail once the social violence had died; if anything, this seems to back up the theories of why the investments were made in the first place.
Probably the most extreme example of how confident the ultra-groups had become in promoting their nationalist ideas post 2010 comes with the “Landskrona”, a charter drawn up by Zenit St Petersburg fans in 2012 that set out their manifesto to the Zenit board on how they would like their team to be run. The Landskrona’s main point was that “there is no black in the team colours of Zenit”; and that Zenit should not sign black or homosexual players based on the fact that it is inconsistent with their “regional identity” as a white only club. Not only are they unabashed racists, but are quite proud and open to admit it. The manifesto was positively accepted by the mainstream fans and subsequently accompanied by unprecedented levels of racist and homophobic chanting, banners and behaviour in the stadium. Sadly, this has become bizarrely normalised, and even players of non-slavic backgrounds have been forced to accept it with silence. While Spaletti, the Zenit Italian manager responded by saying such actions were “beyond stupid”, his players whether by fear or lack of will, have refused to openly criticise the move. The large scale owners of clubs in Russia have also been silent.
As like anywhere where such actions and behaviours are tolerated, an escalation occurs. Violence is now accepted in Russian football, and recent widespread footage of CSKA Moscow fans fighting a mass brawl in the woods with Dynamo Minsk fans before a recent friendly have gone by almost without passing consideration. Pre-arranged fighting between hooligan groups is now a frequent occurrence, fought between well prepared and trained individuals.
It was only a matter of time before such behaviours followed the Russian National team abroad. There is serious considerations that need to be made before the 2018 World Cup. Members of Man City’s champions league squads have been targeted for racist chanting in recent games, and now seemingly opposition nation fans are also being targeted. Marseille seems to have been the result of a decade long build up of increased nationalism in the game.
Russia need to address this issue quickly by making it clear they will not tolerate it; but after certain MP's were seen to normalise the violence last week, hopes of quick change maybe short coming.